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Abstract—This paper studies an electricity market consisting of
an independent system operator (ISO) and a group of generators.
The goal is to solve the DC optimal power flow (DC-OPF)
problem: have the generators collectively meet the power demand
while minimizing the aggregate generation cost and respecting
line flow limits in the network. The ISO by itself cannot solve
the DC-OPF problem as generators are strategic and do not
share their cost functions. Instead, each generator submits to
the ISO a bid, consisting of the price per unit of electricity at
which it is willing to provide power. Based on the bids, the ISO
decides how much production to allocate to each generator to
minimize the total payment while meeting the load and satisfying
the line limits. We provide a provably correct, decentralized
iterative scheme, termed BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM, for
the resulting Bertrand competition game. Regarding convergence,
we show that the algorithm takes the generators bids to any
desired neighborhood of the efficient Nash equilibrium at a linear
convergence rate. As a consequence, the optimal production of the
generators converges to the optimizer of the DC-OPF problem.
Regarding robustness, we show that the algorithm is robust to
affine perturbations in the bid adjustment scheme and that there
is no incentive for any individual generator to deviate from the
algorithm by using an alternative bid update scheme. We also
establish the algorithm robustness to collusion, i.e., we show that,
as long as each bus with generation has a generator following
the strategy, there is no incentive for any group of generators to
share information with the intent of tricking the system to obtain
a higher payoff. Simulations illustrate our results.
I. INTRODUCTION
As part of the plan to integrate distributed energy resources
(DERs) into the electricity grid, regulating authorities envision
a hierarchical architecture where, at the lower layer, different
sets of DERs coordinate their response under an aggregator
and, at the upper layer, the independent system operator (ISO)
interacts with the aggregators to solve the optimal power
flow (OPF) problem. In this scenario, aggregators function as
(virtual, large-capacity) generators, and the aggregation would
allow DERs to participate into markets in which, individually,
they do not have the capacity to do so. While the DERs
under one aggregator can cooperate among themselves, the
aggregators compete with each other in the electricity market.
In this paper, we focus on the competition aspect of this vision:
we study policies that individual generators, in conjunction
with the ISO, can implement to solve the OPF problem while
acting in a selfish and rational fashion.
Literature review: The study of competition in electricity
markets is a classical topic [3], [4]. Extensively studied models
are supply function, Bertrand (price) and Cournot (capacity)
Preliminary versions appeared in conference proceedings as [1] and [2].
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bidding, see [5], [6], [7], respectively, and references therein.
These studies analyze the properties of the game that different
bidding models result into by determining the existence of the
Nash equilibrium of the game and estimating its efficiency.
Some works [8], [9], [10], [11], on the other hand, propose
iterative algorithms for the players that compute the Nash
equilibrium of the game. However, these algorithms either
require generators to have some information about other
generators (cost functions or bids) or assume that the demand
of each generator is a continuous function of the bids. Our
work does not make any such assumptions, which also rules
out the possibility of using various other Nash equilibrium
learning algorithms, such as best-response [12], fictitious
play [13], and extremum seeking [14], [15]. In a related
set of works [16], [17], decentralized generation planning is
achieved by assuming the generators to be price-takers and
designing iterative schemes based on dual-decomposition [18].
In our work, however, we consider a strategic scenario where
generators bid into the market and are hence price-setters.
The work [19] proposes an iterative auction algorithm for a
market where both generators and consumers are strategic but
does not provide convergence guarantees for the generated
bid sequences. The paper [20], closer in spirit to our work,
proposes an iterative method for the generators to find the
Nash equilibrium assuming they do not have any information
about each other. At each iteration, the generators send to the
ISO the gradient of their cost functions at a certain generation
value and the ISO then adjusts these generation values so that
social welfare is maximized. An important difference between
this setup and ours is that we do not assume truthful bidding
of gradient information by the generators.
Our electricity market game belongs to the broader class of
multi-leader-single-follower games [21], [22]. The Nash equi-
libria of such games can be thought of as optimizers of math-
ematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [23],
that are traditionally solved in a centralized manner [24]. The
work [25] provides a distributed method to find the equilibria
of an MPEC problem but requires the follower’s (the ISO
in our case) optimization to have a unique solution for each
action of the leaders (the generators). This is in general not the
case for electricity markets. Our work broadly relates to the
recent developments in the area of “learning in games”, see
e.g., [26], [27], and references therein. Learning mechanisms
proposed in there do not apply directly to the electricity
market setting as they do not consider network constraints for
allocation of goods. Finally, our work has close connections
with the growing interest in the design of provably correct
distributed algorithms for the cooperative solution of economic
dispatch, see [28], [29], and references therein.
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2Statement of contributions: The background for the inelastic
electricity market game considered here is that the ISO seeks
to find the production levels that solve the DC optimal power
flow (DC-OPF) problem for a group of strategic generators
which do not share their cost functions. Consequently, the
ISO cannot solve the DC-OPF problem by itself. However,
each generator submits a bid to the ISO specifying the
price per unit of electricity at which the generator is willing
to provide power. Given these bids, the ISO decides how
much production to allocate to each generator so that the
cost of generation is minimized, the loads are met, and the
network flow constraints are satisfied. The resulting Bertrand
competition model defines the game among the generators,
where the actions are the bids and the payoffs are the profits.
We define the concept of the efficient Nash equilibrium, that
is, the Nash equilibrium at which the generators are willing
to produce the amount that corresponds to the optimizer of
the DC-OPF problem. Our first contribution gives two set of
conditions that ensure existence and uniqueness, respectively,
of an efficient Nash equilibrium for the inelastic electricity
market game. Our second contribution is the design of the
BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM along with its correctness
analysis. This algorithm can be understood as “learning via
repeated play”, where generators are “myopically selfish”,
changing their bid at each iteration with the aim of maximizing
their own payoff. Along the execution, the only information
available to the generators is their bid and the amount of
generation that the ISO request from them. In particular,
generators are not aware of the number of other generators,
their costs, bids, or payoffs. We show that this decentral-
ized iterative scheme is guaranteed to take the bids of the
generators to any neighborhood of the unique efficient Nash
equilibrium provided the stepsizes are chosen appropriately.
Further, we establish that the convergence rate is linear. Our
third contribution analyzes the robustness properties of the
BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM. Specifically, we establish
that the convergence is not affected by affine disturbances,
thus showing that deviations in stepsizes by the generators
can be handled gracefully. Additionally, we show that there is
no incentive for any individual generator to deviate from the
algorithm by using an alternative bid update scheme. Finally,
we also show that, if at each generator bus there is at least
one generator running the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM,
then there is no incentive for other generators connected to
the network to not follow the algorithm, i.e., this adjustment
scheme becomes a rational choice for all generators. These
properties provide a sound justification for why the group
generators would adopt this iterative bid adjustment scheme to
solve the DC-OPF problem. Simulations illustrate our results.
Notation: Let R, R≥0, Z≥0, Z≥1 be the set of real, nonneg-
ative real, nonnegative integer, and positive integer numbers,
respectively. We use the shorthand notation [n] to denote the
set {1, . . . , n}. The 2-norm on Rn is represented by ‖ · ‖. Let
Bδ(x) = {y ∈ Rn | ‖y − x‖ < δ} be the open ball centered
at x ∈ Rn with radius δ > 0. Given x, y ∈ Rn, xi is the i-th
component of x, and x ≤ y denotes xi ≤ yi for i ∈ [n]. We use
0N = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ RN . We let [u]+ = max{0, u} for u ∈ R.
A directed graph, or simply digraph, is represented by a pair
G = (V, E), where V is the vertex set and E ⊆ V × V is
the edge set. For a digraph, N+vi = {vj ∈ V | (vi, vj) ∈ E}
and N−vi = {vj ∈ V | (vj , vi) ∈ E} are the sets of out- and
in-neighbors of vi, respectively.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider an electrical power network with Nb ∈ Z≥1 buses.
The physical interconnection between the buses is given by
a digraph G = (V, E), where nodes correspond to buses
and edges to physical power lines. The direction for each
edge represents the convention of positive power flow. The
power flow on the line (i, j) ∈ E is zij ∈ R. Each line
(i, j) ∈ E has a limit on the power flowing through it (in
either direction), represented by zij > 0. Assume that each
bus i ∈ [Nb] is connected to ni ∈ Z≥0 strategic generators.
We let N =
∑Nb
i=1 ni be the total number of generators and
assign them a unique identity in [N ]. Let the set of generators
at node i be Gi ⊂ [N ] (this set is empty if there are no
generators connected to bus i). The power demand at bus i is
denoted by yi ≥ 0 and is assumed to be fixed and known to
the Independent System Operator (ISO) that acts as the central
regulating authority. The total demand is y =
∑Nb
i=1 yi. The
cost fn(xn) of generating xn ∈ R≥0 amount of power by the
n-th generator is given by a quadratic function
fn(x) = anx
2 + cnx, (1)
where an > 0 and cn ≥ 0. Given a power allocation x =
(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ RN≥0, the aggregate cost is
∑N
n=1 fn(xn). The
dc optimal power flow problem (DC-OPF) consists of
minimize
(x,z)
N∑
n=1
fn(xn), (2a)
subject to
∑
j∈N+i
zij −
∑
j∈N−i
zij =
∑
n∈Gi
xn − yi, ∀i, (2b)
− zij ≤ zij ≤ zij , ∀(i, j), (2c)
x ≥ 0N . (2d)
This problem finds the generation profile that meets the load at
each bus (ensured by (2b)), respects the line constraints (due
to (2c)), and minimizes the total cost (given by the objective
function (2a)). In (2b) we make the convention that if Gi = ∅,
then the first term on the right-hand side is zero. We assume
that (2) is feasible. Since the individual costs are quadratic, the
optimizer of the problem, denoted (x∗, z∗), is unique [30].
The goal for the ISO is to solve (2). The ISO can interact
with the generators, whereas each generator can only commu-
nicate with the ISO and is not aware of the number of other
generators participating in the market and their respective cost
functions, or the load at its own bus. While the ISO knows
the loads and the limits on the power lines, it does not have
any information about the cost functions of the generators.
Therefore, power allocation is decided following a bidding
process, resulting into a game-theoretic formulation. Instead
of sharing their cost with the ISO, the generators bid the price
per unit of power that they are willing to provide the power
at. This price-based bidding is well known in the economics
literature as Bertrand competition [31, Chapter 12]. Specifi-
cally, generator n bids the cost per unit power bn ∈ R≥0 and,
3when convenient, we denote the bids of all other generators
except n by b−n = (b1, . . . , bn−1, bn+1, . . . , bN ). Given the
bids b = (b1, . . . , bN ) ∈ RN≥0, the ISO solves the following
strategic dc optimal power flow problem (S-DC-OPF)
minimize
(x,z)
N∑
n=1
bnxn, (3a)
subject to
∑
j∈N+i
zij −
∑
j∈N−i
zij =
∑
n∈Gi
xn − yi, ∀i, (3b)
− zij ≤ zij ≤ zij , ∀(i, j), (3c)
x ≥ 0N . (3d)
The difference between (3) and (2) is the objective function
which is linear in the former and nonlinear, convex in the
latter. The ISO solves (3) once all the bids are gathered.
Let (xopt(b), zopt(b)) be the optimizer of (3) that the ISO
selects (note that there might not be a unique optimizer)
given bids b. This determines the power requested from each
generator, given by the vector xopt(b). Knowing this process,
the objective of each generator n is to bid a quantity bn ≥ 0
that maximizes its payoff un : R2≥0 → R,
un(bn, x
opt
n (b)) = bnx
opt
n (b)− fn(xoptn (b)), (4)
where xoptn (b) is the n-th component of the optimizer x
opt(b).
Definition II.1. (Inelastic electricity market game): The in-
elastic electricity market game is defined by the following
(i) Players: the set of generators [N ],
(ii) Action: for each player n, the bid bn ∈ R≥0,
(iii) Payoff: for each player n, the payoff un in (4).
Wherever convenient, for any n ∈ [N ], we use interchange-
ably the notation b and (bn, b−n), as well as, xopt(b) and
xopt(bn, b−n). Note that the payoff of the players is not only
defined by the bids of other players but also by the optimizer
of (3) that the ISO selects. For this reason, the definition of
the pure Nash equilibrium for the game described below is
slightly different from the standard one, see e.g. [32].
Definition II.2. (Nash equilibrium): The (pure) Nash equilib-
rium of the inelastic electricity market game is the bid profile
of the group b∗ ∈ RN≥0 for which there exists an optimizer
(xopt(b∗), zopt(b∗)) of the optimization (3) that satisfies
un(bn, x
opt
n (bn, b
∗
−n)) ≤ un(b∗n, xoptn (b∗)), (5)
for all n ∈ [N ], all bids bn ∈ R≥0, and all optimizers
(xopt(bn, b
∗
−n), z
opt(bn, b−n)) of (3) given bids (bn, b∗−n).
We are specifically interested in bid profiles for which the
optimizer of the DC-OPF problem is also a solution to the S-
DC-OPF problem. This is captured in the following definition.
Definition II.3. (Efficient bid): An efficient bid of the inelastic
electricity market is a bid b∗ ∈ RN≥0 for which the optimizer
(x∗, z∗) of (2) is also an optimizer of (3) given bids b∗ and
x∗n = argmaxx≥0b
∗
nx− fn(x), for all n ∈ [N ]. (6)
The right-hand side of (6) is unique as costs are quadratic.
Definition II.4. (Efficient Nash equilibrium): A bid b∗ is an
efficient Nash equilibrium of the inelastic electricity market
game if it is an efficient bid and is a Nash equilibrium.
At the efficient Nash equilibrium, the production that the
generators are willing to provide, maximizing their profit,
coincides with the optimal generation for the DC-OPF prob-
lem (2). This property justifies the study of efficient Nash
equilibria. Note that given the efficient bid profile, there might
be many solutions to (3) because the problem is linear. Thus,
the ISO might not be able to find x∗ given the efficient
bid. However, once the ISO knows that an efficient Nash
equilibrium bid is submitted, it can ask the generators to also
submit the desirable generation levels at that bid, which would
exactly correspond to the solution of the DC-OPF problem.
III. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EFFICIENT NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
Here, we establish the existence of an efficient Nash equi-
librium of the inelastic electricity market game described in
Section II and provide a condition for its uniqueness.
Proposition III.1. (Existence of efficient Nash equilibrium):
Assume that at each bus of the network either there is more
than one generator or there is none, i.e., either ni = 0 or
ni ≥ 2 for each i ∈ [Nb]. Then, there exists an efficient Nash
equilibrium of the inelastic electricity market game.
Proof: For convenience, we write (2b) and (2c) as
J1z − J2x+ y = 0 and J3z ≤ zc,
respectively. Here, J1 ∈ {0, 1,−1}Nb×Nb defines the intercon-
nection of buses in the digraph G, specifically, (i, j)-th element
of J1 is 1 if (i, j) ∈ E , is −1 if (j, i) ∈ E , and 0 otherwise. The
matrix J2 ∈ {0, 1}Nb×N defines the connectivity of generators
to buses, that is, (i, j)-th element of J2 is 1 if and only if j-th
generator is connected to i-th bus. Lastly,
J3 =
[
I|E|
−I|E|
]
and zc =
[
z
z
]
.
The Lagrangian of the optimization (2) is
L(x, z, ν, µ, λ) =
∑N
n=1 fn(xn) + ν
>(J1z − J2x+ y)
+ µ>(J3z − zc)− λ>x,
where ν ∈ RNb , µ ∈ R2|E|≥0 , and λ ∈ RN≥0 are Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to constraints (2b), (2c), and (2d),
respectively. Since constraints (2b)-(2c) are affine and the
feasibility set is nonempty, the refined Slater condition is
satisfied for (2) and hence, the duality gap between the primal
and the dual optimization problems is zero [30]. Under this
condition, a primal-dual optimizer (x∗, z∗, ν∗, µ∗, λ∗) satisfies
the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
∇f(x∗)− J>2 ν∗ − λ∗ = 0, (7a)
J>1 ν
∗ − J>3 µ∗ = 0, (7b)
J1z
∗ − J2x∗ + y = 0, (7c)
J3z
∗ ≤ zc, x∗ ≥ 0, (7d)
λ∗ ≥ 0, µ∗ ≥ 0, (7e)
(x∗)>λ∗ = 0, and (µ∗)>(J3z∗ − zc) = 0, (7f)
4where ∇f(x∗) = (∇f1(x∗1),∇f2(x∗2), . . . ,∇fN (x∗N ))>. In
the rest of the proof, we show that the following bid profile,
constructed from a primal-dual optimizer, is an efficient Nash
equilibrium of the inelastic electricity market game
b∗n =
{
ν∗i(n), if min{x∗m | m ∈ Gi(n)} > 0,
∇fn(0), otherwise,
(8)
where i(n) ∈ [Nb] denotes the bus of the network to which
generator n is connected to. Given the form (1) of the cost
functions, we deduce b∗ ≥ 0. Moreover, from the definition
of J2, one can deduce that either all generators n ∈ Gi have
b∗n = νi or all of them have x
∗
n = 0. Next, to show that the
bid b∗ defined in (8) is efficient, we first establish
x∗n = argmaxx≥0b
∗
nx− fn(x), (9)
for all n ∈ [N ]. For each n, consider the optimization
maxx≥0 b∗nx − fn(x). Because zero duality holds for this
optimization, a point xo ∈ R≥0 is an optimizer if and only if
it satisfies the KKT conditions
b∗n −∇fn(xo)− µo = 0,
µo ≥ 0, xo ≥ 0, µoxo = 0,
where µo is the dual optimizer. Since x∗n satisfies the above
conditions with µo = λ∗n, the expression (9) holds. To claim
the efficiency of b∗, we next show that (x∗, z∗) is one of the
optimizers of (3) given bids b∗. Note that the KKT conditions
for (3) are given by (7) with the term ∇f(x∗) in (7a) replaced
with b∗. Also, one can show using the KKT conditions (7) and
the definition of b∗ that b∗ − J>2 ν∗ ≥ 0. Using these facts,
we deduce that (x∗, z∗, ν∗, µ∗, b∗ − J>2 ν∗) satisfies the KKT
conditions for (3) and hence, (x∗, z∗) is an optimizer of (3).
Our final step is to show the Nash equilibrium condition (5)
for the bid profile b∗. Note that for each n, the payoff at the bid
profile-optimizer pair (b∗, xopt(b∗)) = (b∗, x∗) is nonnegative.
Specifically, if x∗n = 0, then un(b
∗
n, x
opt
n (b
∗)) = 0. If x∗n > 0,
using the fact that ∇fn(x) ≤ b∗n for all x ∈ [0, x∗n], we get
un(b
∗
n, x
opt
n (b
∗)) = b∗nx
∗
n − fn(x∗n)
=
∫ x∗n
0
∇(b∗nx− fn(x))dx
=
∫ x∗n
0
(b∗n −∇fn(x))dx ≥ 0.
Now pick any generator n ∈ [N ]. For bid bn 6= b∗n we have two
cases, first, bn > b∗n and second, bn ≤ b∗n. For the first case,
either (i) x∗n = 0 which implies that x
opt(bn, b
∗
−n) = 0 and so
un(bn, x
opt
n (bn, b
∗
−n)) = un(b
∗
n, x
∗
n) = 0; or (ii) x
∗
n > 0, so all
bids at bus i(n) are equal, implying that n increasing its bid
yields xoptn (bn, b
∗
−n) = 0. That is, un(bn, x
opt
n (bn, b
∗
−n)) =
0 ≤ un(b∗n, x∗n). For the second case,
un(bn, x
opt
n (bn, b
∗
−n)) = bnx
opt
n (bn, b
∗
−n)− fn(xoptn (bn, b∗−n))
≤ b∗nxoptn (bn, b∗−n)− fn(xoptn (bn, b∗−n))
≤ b∗nx∗n − fn(x∗n) = un(b∗n, x∗n),
where in the first inequality we use bn ≤ b∗n and in the second
we use (9). This shows (5), concluding the proof.
Note that the condition in Proposition III.1 of having zero or
at least two generators at each bus is reasonable. If this is not
the case, i.e., there is a bus with a single generator, and the line
capacities are such that the load at that bus can only be met by
that generator, then there is possibility of market manipulation.
The generator at the bus can set its bid arbitrarily high as
no other generator can meet that load and consequently, there
does not exist a Nash equilibrium. Next we provide a sufficient
condition that ensures uniqueness of the efficient bid.
Lemma III.2. (Uniqueness of the efficient bid): Assume that
the optimizer x∗ of (2) satisfies x∗n > 0 for all n ∈ [N ]. Then,
there exists a unique efficient bid b∗ ∈ RN≥0 of the inelastic
electricity market game given by
b∗n = ∇fn(x∗n) = 2anx∗n + cn, for all n (10)
Proof: By definition, an efficient bid b ∈ RN≥0 satisfies
x∗n = argmaxx≥0bnx− fn(x)
for all n. Since x∗n > 0, first-order optimality condition of
the above optimization yields bn = ∇fn(x∗n). This estab-
lishes (10) and hence, the uniqueness.
From Proposition III.1 and Lemma III.2, we conclude the
following result.
Corollary III.3. (Uniqueness of the efficient Nash equilib-
rium): Assume that at each bus of the network either there
is more than one generator or there is none. Further assume
that the optimizer x∗ of (2) satisfies x∗n > 0 for all n ∈ [N ].
Then, there exists a unique efficient Nash equilibrium of the
inelastic electricity market game given by (10) for all n.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that the sufficient
conditions in Corollary III.3 hold unless otherwise stated. Note
that the definition of the unique efficient Nash equilibrium
given in (10) is consistent with the one provided in (8). This
is so because if x∗n > 0 for all n, then ∇fn˜(x∗n˜) = ν∗i for
each bus i ∈ [Nb] and every generator n˜ ∈ Gi.
IV. THE BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM AND ITS
CONVERGENCE PROPERTIES
In this section, we introduce a decentralized Nash equilib-
rium seeking algorithm, termed BID ADJUSTMENT ALGO-
RITHM. We show that its executions lead the generators to
the unique efficient Nash equilibrium, and consequently, to
the optimizer of the DC-OPF problem (2).
A. BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM
We start with an informal description of the BID ADJUST-
MENT ALGORITHM. The algorithm is iterative and can be
interpreted as “learning via repeated play” of the inelastic
electricity market game by the generators. Both ISO and
generators have bounded rationality, with each generator trying
to maximize its own profit and the ISO trying to maximize the
welfare of the entities.
[Informal description]: At each iteration k, gen-
erators decide on a bid and send it to the ISO.
Once the ISO has obtained the bids, it computes an
optimizer of the S-DC-OPF problem (3), denoted
(xopt(k), zopt(k)) for convenience, and sends the
5corresponding production level at the optimizer to
each generator. At the (k+1)-th iteration, generators
adjust their bid based on their previous bid, the
amount of produced power that maximizes their
payoff for the previous bid, and the allocation of
generation assigned by the ISO. The iterative process
starts with the generators arbitrarily selecting initial
bids that yield a positive profit.
The BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM is formally presented
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM
Executed by: generators n ∈ [N ] and ISO
Data : cost fn and stepsizes {βk}k∈Z≥1 for each
generator n, and load y for ISO
Initialize : Each generator n selects arbitrarily
bn(1) ≥ cn, sets k = 1, and jumps to step 4;
ISO sets k = 1 and waits for step 6
1 while k > 0 do
/* For each generator n: */
2 Receive xoptn (k − 1) from ISO
3 Set bn(k)=[bn(k−1)+βk(xoptn (k−1)− qn(k−1))]+
4 Set qn(k) = argmaxq≥0bn(k)q − fn(q)
5 Send bn(k) to the ISO; set k = k + 1
/* For ISO: */
6 Receive bn(k) from each n ∈ [N ]
7 Find a solution (xopt(k), zopt(k)) to (3) given b(k)
8 Send xoptn (k) to each n ∈ [N ]; set k = k + 1
9 end
In the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM, the role of the ISO
is to compute an optimizer of the S-DC-OPF problem after
the bids are submitted. Generators adjust their bids at each
iteration in a “myopically selfish” and rational fashion, with
the sole aim of maximizing their payoff. Intuitively,
if n gets xoptn (k) = 0, two things can happen: (i) n was will-
ing to produce a positive quantity qn(k) > 0 at bid bn(k)
but the demand from the ISO is xoptn (k) = 0. Thus, the
rational choice for n is to decrease the bid in the next
iteration and increase its chances of getting a positive
payoff; (ii) n was willing to produce nothing qn(k) = 0
at bn(k) and got xoptn (k) = 0. At this point, reducing the
bid will not increase the payoff as it will not be willing
to produce more at a lower bid. Alternatively, increasing
the bid will not make the amount that the ISO wants the
generator to produce positive. Hence, the bid stays put.
if n gets xoptn (k) > 0, then it would want to move the bid
in the direction that makes its payoff higher in the next
iteration, assuming that n gets a positive generation signal
from the ISO in the next round. If qn(k) < xoptn (k), then
the demand from the ISO is more than what the generator
is willing to produce, so n increases its cost, i.e., the bid.
If qn(k) > xoptn (k), then the demand is less than what
the generator is willing to supply so n decreases its bid.
Remark IV.1. (Information structure and other learning ap-
proaches): Generators have no knowledge of the number
of other players, their actions, or their payoffs. The only
information they have at each iteration is their own bid
and the generation that the ISO requests from them. This
information structure rules out the applicability of a number
of Nash equilibrium learning methods, including best-response
dynamics [12], fictitious play [13], or other gradient-based
adjustments [10], all requiring some kind of information about
other players. Methods that relax this requirement, such as
extremum seeking used in [14], [15], rely on the payoff
functions being continuous in the actions of the players, which
is not the case for the inelastic electricity market game. •
Remark IV.2. (Stopping criteria and justification of “myopi-
cally selfish” strategies): Algorithm 1 consists of an infinite
number of iterations. To make it implementable, later we iden-
tify stopping criteria, see Remark IV.9, based on a parameter
that the ISO selects. Since this is not known to the generators,
they cannot predict when the algorithm will terminate and,
hence, they do not have an incentive to play strategically to
maximize their payoff in the long term. Given this, they should
focus on maximizing the payoff in the next iteration, which
justifies the myopically selfish perspective adopted here. •
B. Convergence analysis
In this section, we show that the generator bids along any
execution of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM converge
to a neighborhood of the unique efficient Nash equilibrium.
The size of the neighborhood is a decreasing function of the
stepsize and can be made arbitrarily small.
We first present a series of results that highlight certain
geometric properties of the bid update done in Step 3 of
Algorithm 1. These results form the basis for establishing later
the convergence guarantee. The following result states that one
could neglect the projection operator in Step 3 of Algorithm 1.
Lemma IV.3. (Generator bids are lower bounded): In Algo-
rithm 1, let 0 < βk < 2an for all n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ Z≥1.
Then, bn(k) ≥ cn and for all n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ Z≥1,
qn(k) =
bn(k)− cn
2an
. (11)
Proof: Equation (11) follows directly from bn(k) ≥ cn,
so we focus on proving the latter. We proceed by induction.
Note that bn(1) ≥ cn for all n ∈ [N ]. Assume that bn(k) ≥ cn
for some k ∈ Z≥1 and let us show bn(k + 1) ≥ cn. We have
bn(k + 1)= [bn(k) + βk(x
opt
n (k)− qn(k))]+
(a)
≥ [bn(k)−βkqn(k)]+ (b)=
[
bn(k)−βk
(bn(k)− cn
2an
)]+
=
[(
1− βk
2an
)
bn(k) + βk
cn
2an
]+
(c)
=
(
1− βk
2an
)
bn(k) + βk
cn
2an
,
where (a) is due to the fact that xoptn (k) ≥ 0, (b) follows
from the definition of qn(k) given the fact that bn(k) ≥ cn,
and (c) follows from the assumption that βk < 2an for all
6n (which makes both terms in the expression positive). By
contradiction, assume bn(k + 1) < cn. Then,(
1− βk
2an
)
bn(k) + βk
cn
2an
< cn,
which implies that bn(k) < cn, a contradiction.
Our next result gives a different expression for the bid
update step (cf. Step 3) presenting a geometric perspective of
the direction along which the bids are moving. Specifically, we
write the k+ 1-th bid as the addition of two vectors. The first
one is a convex combination of the k-th bid and the efficient
Nash equilibrium b∗. Hence, the first vector is closer to b∗
as compared to the k-th bid. The second one depends on the
difference between what the ISO requests from the generators
and the optimizer of (2). If the second term is small enough,
then we are assured that the bids move towards b∗.
Lemma IV.4. (Geometric characterization of the bid update):
In Algorithm 1, let 0 < βk < 2an for all n ∈ [N ] and k ∈
Z≥1. Then, we have
b(k + 1) = bcoc(k + 1) + βk(x
opt(k)− x∗),
for all k ∈ Z≥1, where for each n ∈ [N ],
bcocn (k + 1) =
(
1− βk
2an
)
bn(k) +
βk
2an
b∗n.
Proof: In the proof of Lemma IV.3, we have shown that
for all n and k, the term inside the projection operator [·]+ in
Step 3 of Algorithm 1 is nonnegative. Hence, the projection
can be dropped and we can write
bn(k + 1) = bn(k) + βk(x
opt
n (k)− qn(k))
(a)
= bn(k) + βk(x
opt
n (k))− βk
(bn(k)− cn
2an
)
=
(
1− βk
2an
)
bn(k) + βk
(
xoptn (k) +
cn
2an
)
=
(
1− βk
2an
)
bn(k) + βk(x
opt
n (k)− x∗n)
+ βk
(
x∗n +
cn
2an
)
(b)
=
(
1− βk
2an
)
bn(k) +
βk
2an
b∗n + βk(x
opt
n (k)− x∗n).
In the above expression, we have used (11) in the equality (a)
and (10) in the equality (b).
The next result gives a lower bound on the inner product
between the direction in which the bids move and the direction
towards the efficient Nash equilibrium.
Lemma IV.5. (Bids move in the direction of the efficient Nash
equilibrium): In Algorithm 1, let 0 < βk < 2an for all n ∈ [N ]
and k ∈ Z≥1. Let amax = maxn{an}. Then, for all k ∈ Z≥1,
〈b(k + 1)− b(k), b∗ − b(k)〉 ≥ βk
2amax
‖b(k)− b∗‖2. (12)
Proof: Using Lemma IV.4, we write
〈b(k + 1)− b(k), b∗ − b(k)〉
= 〈b(k + 1)− bcoc(k + 1), b∗ − b(k)〉
+ 〈bcoc(k + 1)− b(k), b∗ − b(k)〉
= βk〈xopt(k)− x∗, b∗ − b(k)〉+
N∑
n=1
βk
2an
(b∗n − bn(k))2
(a)
≥ ∑Nn=1 βk2an (b∗n − bn(k))2 ≥ βk2amax ‖b(k)− b∗‖2.
For the inequality (a), we have used the fact that
〈xopt(k)− x∗, b∗−b(k)〉 = (〈xopt(k), b∗〉 − 〈x∗, b∗〉)
+
(〈x∗, b(k)〉 − 〈xopt(k), b(k)〉) ≥ 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that x∗ and xopt(k)
are the optimizers of (3) given b∗ and b(k), resp., making both
expressions on the right-hand side nonnegative.
The next result states that the distance between consecutive
bids decreases as the bids get closer to b∗. In combination with
Lemma IV.5, one can see intuitively that the bids get closer to
b∗ and, as they get closer to it, the bid update step behaves as
if the bids are reaching an equilibrium of the update scheme.
These two facts lead to convergence.
Lemma IV.6. (Distance between consecutive bids is upper
bounded): In Algorithm 1, let 0 < βk < 2an for all n ∈ [N ]
and k ∈ Z≥1. Let amin = minn{an}. Then, for all k ∈ Z≥1,
‖b(k + 1)− b(k)‖2 ≤ β
2
k
2a2min
‖b(k)− b∗‖2 + 8β2ky2. (13)
Proof: Consider the following
‖b(k + 1)− b(k)‖2
(a)
=
N∑
n=1
( βk
2an
(b∗n − bn(k)) + βk(xoptn (k)− x∗n)
)2
(b)
≤
N∑
n=1
2
( βk
2an
(b∗n − bn(k))
)2
+
N∑
n=1
2β2k(x
opt
n (k)− x∗n)2
(c)
≤ β
2
k
2a2min
‖b(k)− b∗‖2 + 2β2k‖xopt(k)− x∗‖2. (14)
In the above expression, (a) follows from the expression of
bn(k + 1) from Lemma IV.4, (b) follows from the inequality
(x+ y)2 ≤ 2(x2 + y2) for x, y ∈ R, and (c) follows from the
definition of amin. Note that
‖xopt(k)− x∗‖ ≤
N∑
n=1
∣∣xoptn (k)− x∗n∣∣ ≤ N∑
n=1
∣∣xoptn (k)∣∣+ |x∗n|
=
∑N
n=1(x
opt
n (k) + x
∗
n) = 2y.
The proof concludes by using the above bound in (14).
We are ready to present the main convergence result.
Theorem IV.7. (Convergence of the BID ADJUSTMENT AL-
GORITHM): In Algorithm 1, let 0 < βk < 2an for all n ∈ [N ]
and k ∈ Z≥1. Further, let 0 < r < ‖b(1) − b∗‖ and for all
k ∈ Z≥1 assume
α ≤ βk ≤ B(r) := 1
2amax
( 1
2a2min
+
16y2
r2
)−1
, (15)
for some α > 0. Then, the following holds
(i) there exists l ∈ Z≥1 such that ‖b(l) − b∗‖ < r and for
7all k ∈ [l − 1], we have ‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≥ r with
‖b(k + 1)− b∗‖ ≤
(
1− α
2amax
)k/2
‖b(1)− b∗‖, (16)
(ii) for all k ≥ l,
‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≤
(
1 +
B(r)
2amax
)1/2
r. (17)
Proof: Assume that ‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≥ r for some k ∈ Z≥1.
Then, the upper bound on the stepsizes in the inequality (15)
holds when r is replaced with ‖b(k) − b∗‖, that is, βk ≤
B(‖b(k)− b∗‖) for all k ∈ Z≥1. This is because r 7→ B(r) is
strictly increasing in the domain r > 0. Proceeding with this
replacement and reordering (15), we obtain
βk
(‖b(k)− b∗‖2
2a2min
+ 16y2
)
≤ 1
2amax
‖b(k)− b∗‖2,
or equivalently,
βk
2a2min
‖b(k)− b∗‖2 + 16βky2 − 1
amax
‖b(k)− b∗‖2
≤ − 1
2amax
‖b(k)− b∗‖2. (18)
Now consider the following inequalities
‖b(k + 1)− b∗‖2 = ‖b(k + 1)− b(k) + b(k)− b∗‖2
= ‖b(k + 1)− b(k)‖2 + ‖b(k)− b∗‖2
+ 2〈b(k + 1)− b(k), b(k)− b∗〉
(a)
≤ β
2
k
2a2min
‖b(k)− b∗‖2 + 8β2ky2 + ‖b(k)− b∗‖2
− βk
amax
‖b(k)− b∗‖2 (19a)
(b)
≤
(
1− βk
2amax
)
‖b(k)− b∗‖2, (19b)
where in (a) we have used the bounds (12) and (13) from
Lemmas IV.5 and IV.6, respectively, and the inequality (b)
is implied by that in (18). Note that the inequality (18) is
conservative in the sense that the term 16βky2 could be re-
placed with 8βky2 and the inequality (19b) would still follow.
However, we opt for this conservativeness while defining the
map r 7→ B(r) in (15) because it results into robustness
guarantees for the algorithm as discussed in the forthcoming
section. Therefore, (19b) holds whenever ‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≥ r. By
assumption, we have 0 <
(
1− βk2amax
)
< 1, ‖b(1)− b∗‖ > r,
and βk ≥ α for all k ∈ Z≥1. Using these facts and
applying (19b) recursively, we conclude part (i).
For part (ii), note that if ‖b(k) − b∗‖ ≥ r for some k ≥ l,
then ‖b(k + 1) − b∗‖ < ‖b(k) − b∗‖ by (19b). Therefore, to
find an upper bound on ‖b(k) − b∗‖ for all k ≥ l, we only
need to consider the case when ‖b(k)−b∗‖ < r. Plugging this
bound in (19a) and neglecting the negative term, we get
‖b(k + 1)− b∗‖2 ≤ β
2
kr
2
2a2min
+ 8β2ky
2 + r2. (20)
From (15), we have
β2kr
2
2a2min
+ 16β2ky
2 ≤ βkr
2
2amax
.
The result now follows by upper bounding the right-hand side
of (20) with the left-hand side of the above expression and
then employing the bound on the stepsizes give in (15).
Remark IV.8. (Convergence properties from Theorem IV.7):
The assertion (i) of Theorem IV.7 implies that for any choice
of r > 0, one can select stepsizes according to (15) so that
bids reach the set Br(b∗) in a finite number of steps and at
a linear rate. Further, once bids reach the set Br(b∗), we are
assured from assertion (ii) that they remain in a neighborhood
of b∗, where the size of the neighborhood is proportional to r
(cf. (17)). In combination, the above facts mean that bids con-
verge to any neighborhood of the efficient Nash equilibrium at
a linear rate provided the stepsizes are selected appropriately.
Note that as r becomes small, B(r) gets small and so does α.
Thus, from (16), the rate of convergence decreases as r
becomes small. This presents a trade-off between the desired
precision and the rate of convergence. •
Remark IV.9. (Stopping criteria for the ISO): From the proof
of Theorem IV.7(i) note that, as long as ‖b(k)− b∗‖ > r, the
distance to the efficient Nash equilibrium decreases. Therefore,
if ‖b(k)− b∗‖ > r and k < l, then one can write
‖b(k + 1)− b(k)‖ = ‖b(k + 1)− b∗ + b∗ − b(k)‖
≥ ‖b(k)− b∗‖ − ‖b(k + 1)− b∗‖
(a)
≥ ‖b(k)− b∗‖ −
(
1− α
2amax
)1/2
‖b(k)− b∗‖
=
(
1−
(
1− α
2amax
)1/2)
‖b(k)− b∗‖, (21)
where in (a) we have used (19b) and βk ≥ α. Given this
observation, if the ISO has an estimate of α and amax, then it
can design a stopping criteria based on the distance between
consecutive bids. In fact, if the ISO decides selects  > 0 and
stops the iteration whenever ‖b(k+1)−b(k)‖ ≤ , then it has
the guarantee that either of the following is satisfied
(i) the condition ‖b(k) − b∗‖ > r and k < l is met and
from (21) we get
‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≤ 
(
1−
(
1− α
2amax
)1/2)−1
; (22)
(ii) ‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≤ r; or
(iii) k > l in which case from (17) we get
‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≤
(
1 +
B(r)
2amax
)1/2
r.
The ISO does not know the value of r; its value depends on the
stepsizes that the generators select. Assuming that stepsizes are
small, the ISO can adjust  depending on the desired accuracy
level to get the guarantee (22) for the k-th bid. For small , the
stopping criteria might never be met if stepsizes are too big.•
V. ROBUSTNESS OF THE BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM
Here we study the robustness properties of the BID ADJUST-
MENT ALGORITHM in a variety of scenarios. We first show
that the introduction of disturbances in the bid update mech-
anism does not destroy the algorithm convergence properties.
We then study robustness against either an individual agent or
colluding agents changing their strategy to get a higher payoff.
8A. Robustness to disturbances
Here we establish the robustness properties of the BID
ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM in the presence of disturbances by
characterizing its input-to-state stability (ISS) properties [33].
Let d : Z≥1 → RN model the disturbance to the bid update
mechanism. Such disturbances might arise from agents using
different stepsizes than the prescribed one or other disruption
to the prescribed bid update scheme. The resulting perturbed
version of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM can be written
as the following discrete-time dynamical system
b(k + 1) = [b(k) + βk(x
opt(k)− q(k)) + d(k)]+, (23a)
xopt(k + 1) ∈ Solsopf(b(k + 1)), (23b)
q(k + 1) = Soleff(b(k + 1)), (23c)
where Solsopf : RN≥0 ⇒ RN≥0 and Soleff : RN≥0 → RN≥0 map
a bid profile to the set of optimizers of problem (3) and (6),
respectively. Note that Solsopf is a set-valued map since (3) is
a linear program. If d ≡ 0, then the dynamics (23) represents
the k-th iteration of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM.
The next result shows that the perturbed version of the
algorithm (23) retains the convergence properties of the un-
perturbed version provided the magnitude of the disturbance
satisfies an upper bound dependent on the state of the bid.
Proposition V.1. (The BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM is
robust to perturbations in the bid update): For dynamics (23),
let the hypotheses of Theorem IV.7 hold and assume that
bn(k) ≥ cn for all n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ Z≥1. Let 0 < θ <
1
6
(
1 − α2amax
)
and assume ‖d(k)‖ ≤ θ‖b(k) − b∗‖ for all
k ∈ Z≥1. Then, the following holds
(i) there exists l ∈ Z≥1 such that ‖b(l)− b∗‖ < r and, for
all k ∈ [l − 1], we have ‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≥ r with
‖b(k + 1)− b∗‖
≤
(
1− α
2amax
+ 2θ + 4θ2
)k/2
‖b(1)− b∗‖, (24)
(ii) for all k ≥ l,
‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≤
(
1 +
B(r)
2amax
+ 2θ + 4θ2
)1/2
r. (25)
Proof: Since bn(k) ≥ cn, we obtain for dynamics (23),
qn(k) =
bn(k)−cn
2an
, for all n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ Z≥1. Moreover,
mimicking Lemma IV.4, we rewrite the bid update (23a) as
b(k + 1) = bcoc(k + 1) + βk(x
opt(k)− x∗) + d(k), (26)
for all k ∈ Z≥1. Using (26) and following the steps of
Lemma IV.5 for dynamics (23a) we get,
〈b(k + 1)− b(k),b(k)− b∗〉 ≤ 〈d(k), b(k)− b∗〉
− βk
2amax
‖b(k)− b∗‖2, (27)
for all n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ Z≥1. Similarly, from the reasoning
of Lemma IV.6 we obtain
‖b(k + 1)− b(k)‖2
≤ β
2
k
2a2min
‖b(k)− b∗‖2 + 2
(
‖βk(xopt(k)− x∗) + d(k))‖
)2
≤ β
2
k
2a2min
‖b(k)− b∗‖2 + 4β2k‖xopt(k)− x∗‖2 + 4‖d(k)‖2
≤ β
2
k
2a2min
‖b(k)− b∗‖2 + 16β2ky2 + 4‖d(k)‖2 (28)
for all k ∈ Z≥1 for dynamics (23a). Employing (27) and (28),
assuming ‖b(k) − b∗‖ ≥ r, and writing the set of inequali-
ties (19) with α ≤ βk, we deduce the following
‖b(k + 1)− b∗‖2 ≤
(
1− α
2amax
)
‖b(k)− b∗‖2 + 4‖d(k)‖2
+ 2〈d(k), b(k)− b∗〉. (29)
Finally, using ‖d(k)‖ ≤ θ‖b(k)− b∗‖ we get
‖b(k+1)−b∗‖2 ≤
(
1− α
2amax
+2θ+4θ2
)
‖b(k)−b∗‖2. (30)
Iteratively, we obtain (24). The bound (25) can be computed
in a similar way as done in the proof of Theorem IV.7.
Similar to the convergence guarantees of Theorem IV.7, the
above result establishes that the perturbed version of the algo-
rithm (23) converges to a neighborhood of the efficient Nash
equilibrium provided the stepsizes and the disturbance satisfy
appropriate bounds, and that the size of this neighborhood is
tunable as a function of these.
The next result complements Proposition V.1 by giving an
alternative representation of robustness of (23). It establishes
two properties: first, when the disturbance is bounded (not
necessarily satisfying the bound of Proposition V.1), the bids
remain bounded; second, if the disturbance goes to zero, then
the bids satisfy the bound (17) asymptotically. Notice that
both these results do not follow directly from Proposition V.1,
justifying the need for a formal proof.
Proposition V.2. (Bounded disturbance implies bounded bids
for BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM): For dynamics (23), let
the hypotheses of Theorem IV.7 hold and assume that bn(k) ≥
cn for all n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ Z≥1. Let ‖d(k)‖ ≤ dmax for all
k ∈ Z≥1 and let θ ∈
(
0, 16
(
1− α2amax
))
. Then, the following
holds for all k ∈ Z≥1,
‖b(k)− b∗‖ ≤
(
1− α
2amax
+ 2θ + 4θ2
)k/2
‖b(1)− b∗‖
+G(r, θ, dmax), (31)
where G(r, θ, dmax) := max{G1(r, dmax), G2(θ, dmax)} and
G1(r, dmax) :=
(B(r)r2
2amax
+ (2dmax + r)
2
)1/2
,
G2(θ, dmax) :=
(
2 +
1
θ
)
dmax.
As a consequence, as k →∞, if ‖d(k)‖ → 0, then
max
{
‖b(k)− b∗‖,
(
1 +
B(r)
2amax
)1/2
r
}
→ 0. (32)
Proof: We first show that if for some k ∈ Z≥1, ‖b(k)−
b∗‖ ≤ G(r, θ, dmax), then ‖b(l)− b∗‖ ≤ G(r, θ, dmax) for all
l ≥ k. To this end, as a first case, assume that r ≤ ‖b(k) −
b∗‖ ≤ G(r, θ, dmax). Then, following the steps of the proof of
Proposition V.1, we arrive at (29). If ‖d(k)‖ ≤ θ‖b(k)− b∗‖,
then we get the inequality (30) which implies that ‖b(k+1)−
b∗‖ ≤ ‖b(k) − b∗‖ ≤ G(r, θ, dmax). On the other hand, if
9‖d(k)‖ > θ‖b(k)− b∗‖, then using this bound in (29), we get
‖b(k + 1)− b∗‖2 <
(
1− α
2amax
)‖d(k)‖2
θ2
+ 4‖d(k)‖2
+ 2
‖d(k)‖2
θ
<
( 1
θ2
+
4
θ
+ 4
)
‖d(k)‖2.
Thus, using ‖d(k)‖ ≤ dmax, we get ‖b(k + 1) − b∗‖ <
G2(θ, dmax) ≤ G(r, θ, dmax). As a second case, assume
‖b(k) − b∗‖ < r. Note that r < G(r, θ, dmax), and so
‖b(k)−b∗‖ < G(r, θ, dmax). For this case, using ‖b(k)−b∗‖ <
r and inequalities (27) and (28), we get as in (19a) that
‖b(k + 1)− b∗‖2 ≤ β
2
kr
2
2a2min
+ 16β2ky
2 + 4‖d(k)‖2 + r2
+ 2r‖d(k)‖.
Now applying bounds ‖d(k)‖ ≤ dmax and βk ≤ B(r), we
obtain ‖b(k+1)−b∗‖ ≤ G1(r, dmax). Hence, we arrive at the
conclusion that if ‖b(k) − b∗‖ ≤ G(r, θ, dmax), then ‖b(l) −
b∗‖ ≤ G(r, θ, dmax) for all l ≥ k.
Consider now the case when for some k ∈ Z≥1, ‖b(k) −
b∗‖ > G(r, θ, dmax). By definition of G(r, θ, dmax), this im-
plies that ‖b(k)− b∗‖ > r and ‖b(k)− b∗‖ > d(k)θ . Therefore,
from the proof of Proposition V.1, we arrive at (30). Finally,
combining the reasoning of the two cases when ‖b(k)−b∗‖ is
greater than or less than equal to G(r, θ, dmax), we obtain the
inequality (31). The limit (32) follows from that fact that as
k →∞, the first term of (31) converges to zero and as dmax
tends to zero, G(r, θ, dmax) tends to
(
1 + B(r)2amax
)1/2
r.
One can observe from (31) that the limiting behavior of
the bids depend on the magnitude of r and dmax: if r is
designed to be small enough and if dmax is small enough,
or this bound becomes small as the algorithm iterates, then
the bids do converge to a small neighborhood of b∗.
As an aside, in the theory of ISS for discrete-time dynamical
systems [33], one typically would conclude Proposition V.2
from Proposition V.1. However, the traditional ISS results
require asymptotic convergence of the unperturbed dynamics,
(i.e., dynamics (23) with d ≡ 0) to a point. This is not the
case here and hence, we provide a formal proof.
Remark V.3. ( BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM is robust to
variation in stepsizes): In practice, given that generators are
competing and do not share information with each other, it is
conceivable that they do not agree on a common stepsize.
Propositions V.1 and V.2 provide a way to quantify the
performance of the algorithm when the stepsizes are different.
Specifically, let βk, k ∈ Z≥1, denote a common set of stepsizes
for all generators that satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem IV.7
and hence, guarantees the convergence properties outlined
therein. Assume that each generator selects a different stepsize
at each iteration, denoted as βk,n, k ∈ Z≥1, for generator n.
Then, the bid iteration in Step 3 of the BID ADJUSTMENT
ALGORITHM can be written as (23) where now
dn(k) = (βk,n − βk)(xoptn (k)− qn(k))
for all n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ Z≥1. Now if the variation in stepsizes,
i.e., the quantity βk,n − βk, is bounded above by a particular
function of the distance of the bid-state to the efficient Nash
equilibrium, then the linear convergence and the ultimate
bound is guaranteed following Proposition V.1. On the other
hand, if the variation in stepsizes do not depend on the state but
are bounded then, then the bids still converge asymptotically to
a neighborhood of the efficient Nash equilibrium, as concluded
in Proposition V.2. Note that the assumption of bn(k) ≥ cn
for all n and k holds whenever the stepsizes are positive for
all agents at all times (cf. Lemma IV.3). •
B. Robustness to deviation in bid update
We illustrate here another aspect of robustness of the BID
ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM by establishing that, if all gener-
ators follow the bid update scheme, then there is no incentive
for any generator to deviate from it. We next formalize these
notions. Assume that all generators, except n˜ ∈ [N ], follow
the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM, and that n˜ follows an
arbitrary strategy to update its bids. Then, one can write the
BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM under this deviation as
b−n˜(k + 1) = [b−n˜(k) + βk(x
opt
−n˜(k)− q−n˜(k))]+, (33a)
bn˜(k + 1) = H(k)n˜
(
{bn˜(t), xoptn˜ (t), qn˜(t)}kt=1
)
, (33b)
xopt(k + 1) ∈ Solsopf(b(k + 1)), (33c)
q(k + 1) ∈ Soleff(b(k + 1)), (33d)
where the maps {H(k)n˜ : R3k≥0 → R≥0}∞k=1 represent the update
scheme of n˜ at iterations 1, 2, . . . Recall that the subscript −n˜
denotes the vector without the component corresponding to the
generator n˜. Note that (33b) implies that at each iteration k,
the generator n˜ only knows the bids it made and the quantities
the ISO demanded from it up until iteration k.
We next introduce the notion of “incentive to deviate” from
the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM for the generator n˜. A
natural way to quantify incentives for a generator is in terms
of the payoff (4): a generator has an incentive to deviate if
this would bring in a higher payoff, when the ISO stops the
iteration, than not deviating. This is formalized below.
Definition V.4. (Incentive to deviate from BID ADJUSTMENT
ALGORITHM): Let r > 0 and assume that the stepsizes for any
execution of (33) satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem IV.7. Then,
the generator n˜ ∈ [N ] has an incentive to deviate from the
BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM if there exists an execution
of (33) and l ∈ Z≥1 such that
un˜(bn˜(k), x
opt
n˜ (k)) > u
max
n˜ , (34)
for all k ≥ l, where
umaxn˜ := max
{
un˜(bn˜,x
opt
n˜ (b))
∣∣∣‖b− b∗‖ ≤ (1 + B(r)
2amax
)
r
and xopt(b) ∈ Solsopf(b)
}
. (35)
In the above definition, recall the short-hand notation
xopt(k) for xopt(b(k)). Equation (34) implies that the gen-
erator n˜ has an incentive to deviate if, after a finite number
of iterations, it is guaranteed a higher payoff than what it
might eventually get if it follows the BID ADJUSTMENT
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ALGORITHM. This captures the fact that the generator does
not know when the ISO might stop the bid and hence it would
deviate only when it is guaranteed to get a higher payoff after
a finite number of steps. The next result shows that there is no
incentive to deviate from the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM.
Proposition V.5. (Robustness to deviation from BID ADJUST-
MENT ALGORITHM): For dynamics (33), let the hypotheses
of Theorem IV.7 hold and assume that bn(k) ≥ cn for all
n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ Z≥1. Also, assume that the ISO selects
a vertex solution xopt(k) ∈ Solsopf(b(k)) at each iteration
k ∈ Z≥1. Then, no generator has an incentive to deviate from
the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM.
Proof: We reason by contradiction. Assume that a gener-
ator n˜ has an incentive to deviate from the BID ADJUSTMENT
ALGORITHM. That is, there exists an execution of (33) and
l ∈ Z≥1 such that (34) holds for all k ≥ l. By definition,
umaxn˜ > b
∗
n˜x
∗
n˜ − fn˜(x∗n˜). (36)
Now consider the map
R≥0 3 b 7→ gn˜(b) := max{bq − fn˜(q) | q ≥ 0}.
From (6), we get gn˜(b∗n˜) = b
∗
n˜x
∗
n˜−fn˜(x∗n˜). Further, using (1),
one can show that this map is continuous, strictly increasing
in the domain b ≥ cn˜, and gn˜(b)→∞ as b→∞. These facts
along with (36) imply that there exists a unique bmaxn˜ > b
∗
n˜
such that gn˜(bmaxn˜ ) = u
max
n˜ , gn˜(b) > u
max
n˜ for all b > b
max
n˜ ,
and gn˜(b) < umaxn˜ for all cn˜ ≤ b < bmaxn˜ . Then, (34) reads as
un˜(bn˜(k), x
opt
n˜ (k)) > gn˜(b
max
n˜ ), (37)
for all k ≥ l. From the above expression, we deduce that
bn˜(k) ≥ bmaxn˜ for all k ≥ l. Indeed otherwise, there exists
k˜ ≥ l such that bn˜(k˜) < bmaxn˜ . This further implies that
un˜(bn˜(k˜), x
opt
n˜ (k˜)) = bn˜(k˜)x
opt
n˜ (k˜)− fn˜(xoptn˜ (k˜))
≤ gn˜(bn˜(k˜)) < gn˜(bmaxn˜ ),
contradicting (37). In the above expression, the first inequality
follows from the definition of gn˜ and the second follows from
the fact that gn˜ is strictly increasing.
The above reasoning has helped us establish that bn˜(k) ≥
bmaxn˜ > b
∗
n˜ for all k ≥ l. Note that xoptn˜ (k) > 0 for all
k ≥ l because otherwise un˜(bn˜(k), xoptn˜ (k)) = 0 and (37)
gets violated. By assumption, there exists at least one more
generator connected to the bus i(n˜) to which n˜ is connected
to. For now assume that there is only one other generator
n¯ ∈ [N ] connected to i(n˜). Since for all k ≥ l, xopt(k) is a
solution of (3), from the fact that xoptn˜ (k) > 0, we deduce
bn¯(k) ≥ bn˜(k) ≥ bmaxn˜ ,
for all k ≥ l. Now let
qmaxn¯ := inf
b≥bmaxn˜
argmax{bq − fn¯(q) | q ≥ 0}.
Note that qmaxn¯ > 0 because of the facts: (i) b
∗
n¯ = b
∗
n˜ <
bmaxn˜ ; (ii) argmax{b∗n¯q − fn¯(q) | q ≥ 0} = x∗n¯ > 0; and (iii)
b 7→ argmax{bq − fn¯(q) | q ≥ 0} is nondecreasing. Since
bn¯(k) ≥ bmaxn˜ for all k ≥ l, we obtain qn¯(k) ≥ qmaxn¯ for
all k ≥ l (see Step 4 of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM
for the definition of qn¯(k)). Thus, if bn¯(k) > bn˜(k) for some
k ≥ l, then xoptn¯ (k) = 0 (because xopt(k) is an optimizer
of (3) given bids b(k)) and bn¯(k) > bmaxn˜ . As a consequence,
bn¯(k + 1) = bn¯(k)− βkqn¯(k) ≤ bn¯(k)− αqmaxn¯ . (38)
Therefore, if bn¯(k) > bn˜(k) for some k ≥ l, then from (38)
we deduce that there exists a finite k˜ > k such that, either
bn¯(k˜) < bn˜(k˜) or bn¯(k˜) = bn˜(k˜). In the former case,
un˜(bn˜(k˜), x
opt
n˜ (k˜)) = 0 as x
opt
n˜ (k˜) = 0. This contradicts (34).
In the latter case, two further cases can arise. In the first one,
we get xoptn˜ (k˜) = 0 implying un˜(bn˜(k˜), x
opt
n˜ (k˜)) = 0 and
contradicting (34). In the second one, we obtain xoptn¯ (k) =
0, implying bn¯(k + 1) < bn˜(k + 1). This further yields
un˜(bn˜(k˜ + 1), x
opt
n˜ (k˜ + 1)) = 0, thereby, contradicting (34).
Finally, if there are other generators connected to i(n˜) that
follow the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM, then one can
carry out the same reasoning as done above and show that
we contradict (34). This completes the proof.
Remark V.6. (Generalization of Proposition V.5): It is inter-
esting to observe that in the proof of Proposition V.5, we
have not used at any point that the generators connected
at buses other than the one that n˜ is connected follow the
BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM. In fact, independently of
how such generators update their bids, the BID ADJUSTMENT
ALGORITHM ensures that n˜ does not have any incentive to
deviate. This is a useful property which we use later when
studying robustness to collusion. •
Remark V.7. (Other notions of “incentive to deviate”): In
Definition V.4, one can impose the condition of higher pay-
off (34) to hold for all executions of (33). If this condition
holds, then the generator has an even stronger incentive to
deviate from the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM. However,
by Proposition V.5, we are ensured that there does not exist
such strong incentive to deviate. This is because the result
shows that there does not exist any execution of (33) for
which (34) holds. If, on the other hand, we replace the
condition (34) in Definition V.4 with the requirement that there
exists an execution of (33) along which
lim sup
k→∞
un˜(bn˜(k), x
opt
n˜ (k)) > u
max
n˜ (39)
holds. This inequality means that there exists an execution
of (33) in which the generator n˜ gets a higher payoff than
umaxn˜ infinitely often. Since the ISO can stop the iterations
at any time, the generator is not guaranteed a higher payoff,
but the possibility is still there. We conjecture that the BID
ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM is not robust to this notion of
weak incentive to deviate. However, the obfuscation of the
stopping criteria by the ISO makes such a weak incentive not
enough for a rational generator to deviate. •
C. Robustness to collusion
Here we study the robustness of the BID ADJUSTMENT
ALGORITHM against collusion. Collusion refers to the action
of a set of generators to share among themselves information
about their bids and generation demands by the ISO, with the
goal of getting a higher profit, possibly by deviating from the
bid update scheme. The following makes this notion formal.
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Definition V.8. (Collusion between generators): A group of
generators J ⊂ [N ] form a collusion if at each iteration
k ∈ Z≥1 of the algorithm, each generator n ∈ J ,
(i) has the information
Ik := {(br(t), xoptr (t)) | r ∈ J , t ∈ [k]}, and
(ii) determines its next bid bn(k + 1) based on the infor-
mation Ik, not necessarily following the update scheme
(Step 3) of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM.
An iteration of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM under
a collusion between a group of generators J ⊂ [N ] is given
by the following dynamics
bn(k + 1) = [bn(k) + βk(x
opt
n (k)− qn(k))]+,∀n 6∈ J ,
(40a)
bn(k + 1) = H(k)n
(
Ik, {qn(t)}kt=1
)
,∀n ∈ J (40b)
xopt(k + 1) ∈ Solsopf(b(k + 1)), (40c)
q(k + 1) = Soleff(b(k + 1)), (40d)
where maps {H(k)n : R(2|J |+1)k≥0 → R≥0}n∈J ,k=1,2,... repre-
sent the update scheme of generators in collusion. Notice that
for each generator n, the quantity qn(k), for all k ∈ Z≥1, is
part of its private information, irrespective of the fact that n
belongs to J or not. Next, we define what it means for the
group of generators J to have an incentive to collude.
Definition V.9. (Incentive to collude): Let r > 0 and as-
sume that the stepsizes for any execution of (40) satisfy the
hypotheses of Theorem IV.7. Then, the group of generators
J has an incentive to collude under the BID ADJUSTMENT
ALGORITHM if there exists an execution of (40), a generator
n˜ ∈ J , and l ∈ Z≥1 such that
un˜(bn˜(k), x
opt
n˜ (k)) > u
max
n˜ , (41)
for all k ≥ l, where umaxn˜ is defined in (35).
This notion essentially says that there is an incentive to
collude for the generators in J if there exists at least one
execution of (40) along which at least one generator in J
gets a higher payoff after finite number of steps. The next
result shows that no group of generators has an incentive to
collude provided there is at least one generator at each bus with
generation that follows the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM.
Proposition V.10. (Robustness to collusion under the BID
ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM): For dynamics (40), let the hy-
potheses of Theorem IV.7 hold and assume that bn(k) ≥ cn for
all n ∈ [N ] and k ∈ Z≥1. Assume that the ISO selects a vertex
solution xopt(k) ∈ Solsopf(b(k)) at each iteration k ∈ Z≥1.
Assume that at each bus that has generators connected to
it, there exists at least one generator that follows the update
scheme of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM. Denote these
generators by K ⊂ [N ]. Then, there is no incentive to collude
for any group of generators contained in [N ] \ K.
Proof: Let J ⊂ [N ]\K be a group of generators that form
a collusion. Assume first Scenario 1 where each generator in
J is connected to a different bus. By hypotheses, there exists
at least one other generator following the BID ADJUSTMENT
ALGORITHM at the bus where a generator in J is connected
to. Thus, mimicking the proof of Proposition V.5 (cf. Re-
mark V.6), at each bus, no generator has an incentive to deviate
from the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM. By Definition V.4,
this implies that there does not exist any execution of (40) for
which (41) holds for any generator in J . Hence, for Scenario
1, generators in J do not have an incentive to collude.
Next, consider Scenario 2, where at least a bus, say i ∈ [Nb],
has more than one generator from J , that is, Ji := Gi ∩ J
has cardinality larger than or equal to 2. Let n¯ ∈ Gi be the
generator at i that follows BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM.
For the sake of contradiction, assume the existence of a
generator n˜ ∈ Ji for which (41) holds for some execution
of (40). Since the ISO selects a vertex solution at each iteration
k ∈ Z≥1, we deduce that for all k ≥ l, all other generators in
Ji get zero production signal from the ISO, i.e., xoptn (k) = 0
for all n ∈ Ji \ {n˜} and k ≥ l. Therefore, for the purpose of
analysis, one can neglect the generators in Ji\{n˜} and assume
that only n˜ and n¯ are connected to i. Again, mimicking the
proof of Proposition V.5, we deduce that n˜ does not have an
incentive to deviate and so (41) does not hold, a contradiction.
Since i is arbitrary, we conclude that for Scenario 2, generators
in J do not have an incentive to collude either.
An alternative definition of an incentive to collude could
be where every generator in the collusion gets a higher payoff
after a finite number of steps. Proposition V.10 however shows
that, under the assumed hypotheses, such a scenario does
not occur as there is not even a single generator that gets
a higher payoff after a finite number of iterations. Note that
the assumptions of the above result is tight in the sense that if
all generators at a bus collude, then based on the load and the
line limits, generators at that bus can increase their bid to an
arbitrarily high value, thus creating an incentive to collude.
Remark V.11. (Limitations on robustness under generator
bounds): The robustness of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGO-
RITHM against deviation and collusion relies heavily on the
fact that we have not considered upper bounds on the genera-
tion capacities. In the presence of such bounds, the generators
might be able to push the bids and their individual utilities
to a higher value based on the load at the respective bus and
the capacity constraints on the lines connected to the bus. To
avoid such behavior of market manipulation, either one can
modify network capacities or investigate alternative allocation
mechanisms that disincentivizes such behavior. •
VI. SIMULATIONS
We illustrate the convergence and robustness properties of
the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM using a modified IEEE
9-bus test case [34]. The traditional IEEE 9-bus system has 3
generators, at buses v1, v2, and v3 and three loads at buses
v5, v7, and v9. In our modified test case, we have added one
generator each at buses v1, v2 and v3. The interconnection
topology is given in Figure 1. The line flow limit between
any two buses (vi, vj) is 2.5 except for three lines, (v5, v6),
(v3, v6), and (v6, v7), for which the limits are 1.5, 3.0, and
1.5, respectively. The loads are y5 = 2, y7 = 3, and y9 = 1,
where yi denotes the load at bus vi. The cost function for each
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Fig. 1. Network layout of the modified IEEE 9-bus test case.
generator i is fi(xi) = aix2i + cixi, where the coefficients for
all the generators are given by the vectors
a = (0.1100, 0.0950, 0.0850, 0.1000, 0.1225, 0.0750),
c = (3.5, 3.8, 1.2, 0.8, 1.0, 1.3). (42)
For the given costs and loads, the generation profile at the
optimizer of the DC-OPF problem (2) is
x∗ = (1.4268, 0.0732, 0.2703, 2.2297, 1.8987, 1.1013),
and the unique efficient Nash equilibrium is
b∗ = (3.8139, 3.8139, 1.2459, 1.2459, 1.4652, 1.4652). (43)
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the bids and their distance to
the efficient Nash equilibrium along an execution of the BID
ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM. The initial bids b(1) are selected
satisfying bn(1) ≥ cn for all the generators n ∈ [6]. The
stepsizes are constant, βk = 0.01 for all k, and satisfy βk <
2an. As predicted by Theorem IV.7, Figure 2 shows that the
bids converge towards the efficient Nash equilibrium b∗ at a
linear rate and, after a finite number of steps, remain in a
neighborhood of b∗. If one selects r = 1.35, then B(r) =
0.0101 and condition (15) holds for the stepsizes. Computing
the right hand side of (17) using these values, we conclude
that bids eventually remain in the neighborhood centered at
b∗ with radius 1.3775. Figure 2(b) validates this claim and, in
fact, shows that the bound is conservative since bids actually
remain in a neighborhood of radius 0.05.
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Fig. 2. Execution of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM for the modified
IEEE 9-bus test case in Figure 1. The cost function for each generator i is
fi(xi) = aix
2
i + cixi, with coefficients given in (42). The load is y5 = 2,
y7 = 3, and y9 = 1. The efficient Nash equilibrium b∗ is given in (43).
Plots (a) and (b) show, respectively, the evolution of the bids and their
distance to b∗. The stepsizes are βk = 0.01 for all k and the initial bids are
b(1) = (7.6096, 9.9313, 7.6087, 8.4827, 6.6175, 7.5254). Bids converge to
and then remain in a neighborhood of the efficient Nash equilibrium.
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Fig. 3. Execution of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM under different
stepsize selection for the example of Figure 2. All data is the same except
for the stepsizes. In plots (a) and (b), each generator at each iteration ran-
domly selects the stepsize from the set [0.001, 0.1] with uniform probability
distribution. We observe that the bids still converge to a neighborhood of
the efficient Nash equilibrium, but the size of the neighborhood is bigger
than that achieved in Figure 2. In plots (c) and (d), the interval of stepsize
selection decays with time to a single point 0.01. The bids now converge
to the efficient Nash equilibrium with greater accuracy. These observations
validate the robustness guarantees of Proposition V.2.
We next illustrate the robustness properties of the BID
ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM against disturbances (cf. Sec-
tion V-A). Figure 3 considers the same setup as above but
now with generators choosing a different stepsize at each
iteration. These differences in stepsizes can be interpreted
as a disturbance to the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM, as
discussed in Remark V.3. In Figure 3(a)-(b), the interval
from which stepsizes are selected is constant, whereas in
Figure 3(c)-(d) the size of this interval decays with time. In
both cases, the bids converge to a neighborhood of b∗ (in the
latter case of decaying interval, the bids converge to a smaller
neighborhood), as established in Proposition V.2. Observe that
the convergence rate in Figure 3(a)-(b) is higher than in Fig-
ure 2(a)-(b). This is because stepsizes are allowed to be large in
the former. However, this higher convergence rate comes with
the pitfall of loss in accuracy, cf. Remark IV.8. Hence, to retain
both properties, stepsizes should be large initially and decay
as iterations proceed. This is seen in Figure 3(c)-(d), where
stepsizes decay over time (in expectation), yielding both high
convergence rate and accuracy. Finally, Figure 4 demonstrates
the robustness against collusion of the BID ADJUSTMENT
ALGORITHM (cf. Section V-C), where generators 1, 3, and 5
form a collusion. These generators may select their bids in any
fashion they want: for this example, we assume a particular
strategy of bid selection, explained in Figure 4. The plot shows
that the utility of the colluding generators eventually becomes
lower than umaxn (defined in (35)). Hence, there is no incentive
for collusion, as ensured by Proposition V.10.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have formulated an inelastic electricity market game
capturing the strategic interaction between generators in a
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Fig. 4. Execution of the BID ADJUSTMENT ALGORITHM for the example
considered in Figure 2 with generators 1, 3, and 5 forming a collusion. The
initial condition is the same and the stepsize is 0.01 at each iteration for
generators 2, 4, and 6. For each n ∈ {1, 3, 5}, at each iteration k, bn(k) =
0.99 ∗ bn+1(k) if this value is bigger than or equal to b∗n. Otherwise, bn(k)
is selected randomly from the interval [b∗n, b∗n +1], with uniform probability
distribution. With this choice of bid, the colluding generators aim to get a
positive production signal and at the same time bid high enough so as to
obtain a high utility. The plot shows the evolution of the difference between
the utility obtained at each iteration, un(bn(k), x
opt
n (k)), and the utility at the
optimal bid and generation, un(b∗n, x
opt
n (b
∗)) for each n ∈ {1, 3, 5}. This
value becomes negative for all generators after a finite number of iterations.
Since umaxn > un(b
∗
n, x
∗
n), the example shows that (41) does not hold.
bid-based energy dispatch setting. For this game, we have
established the existence and uniqueness of the efficient Nash
equilibria. We have also designed the BID ADJUSTMENT
ALGORITHM, which is an iterative strategy amenable to decen-
tralized implementation that provably converges to a neighbor-
hood of the efficient Nash equilibrium at a linear rate. We have
characterized the robustness properties of the algorithm against
disturbances, deviation in bid updates, and collusions among
generators. Future work will analyze the dynamic behavior
of the market under other bidding schemes, such as Cournot
bidding, supply function bidding, and price-capacity bidding.
We would also like to examine the convergence of other
learning schemes such as regret minimization in the context of
electricity markets. Finally, we wish to incorporate stochastic
load demands and changing sets of generators in our setup.
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